Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: TPMs and random numbers | From | David Safford <> | Date | Wed, 11 Sep 2013 14:47:04 -0400 |
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On Wed, 2013-09-11 at 10:49 -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > On Wed, Sep 11, 2013 at 10:22 AM, David Safford <safford@us.ibm.com> wrote: > >>On 09/09/2013 02:11 PM, H. Peter Anvin wrote: > > A TPM that has an excellent internal entropy source and is FIPS 140-2 > compliant with no bugs whatsoever may still use Dual_EC_DRBG, which > looks increasingly likely to be actively malicious.
I don't know of any that do so (it's more complex and slower than the alternatives).
> I'd be *much* happier if my system read a few hundred random bytes > from the TPM at startup and fed those bytes into the kernel's entropy > pool. This should IMO happen at startup as early as possible.
I agree completely that the ideal case is a system with good entropy sources, including a TPM, and all these mixed as early as possible. But I also think that the existing (certified) TPMs are good enough for direct use.
dave
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