Messages in this thread | | | Date | Wed, 14 Aug 2013 12:26:24 -0700 | From | Andy Lutomirski <> | Subject | Re: DoS with unprivileged mounts |
| |
On 08/14/2013 10:42 AM, Miklos Szeredi wrote: > There's a simple and effective way to prevent unlink(2) and rename(2) > from operating on any file or directory by simply mounting something > on it. In any mount instance in any namespace. > > Was this considered in the unprivileged mount design? > > The solution is also theoretically simple: mounts in unpriv namespaces > are marked "volatile" and are dissolved on an unlink type operation.
I'd actually prefer the reverse: unprivileged mounts don't prevent unlink and rename. If the dentry goes away, then the mount could still exist, sans underlying file. (This is already supported on network filesystems.)
--Andy
| |