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SubjectRe: DoS with unprivileged mounts
On 08/14/2013 10:42 AM, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> There's a simple and effective way to prevent unlink(2) and rename(2)
> from operating on any file or directory by simply mounting something
> on it. In any mount instance in any namespace.
>
> Was this considered in the unprivileged mount design?
>
> The solution is also theoretically simple: mounts in unpriv namespaces
> are marked "volatile" and are dissolved on an unlink type operation.

I'd actually prefer the reverse: unprivileged mounts don't prevent
unlink and rename. If the dentry goes away, then the mount could still
exist, sans underlying file. (This is already supported on network
filesystems.)

--Andy


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