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SubjectRe: [PATCH 5/6] x86: kaslr: select memory region from e820 maps
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On Fri, Apr 26, 2013 at 2:51 PM, Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org> wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 26, 2013 at 12:03 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>> This chooses the largest contiguous RAM region for the KASLR offset
>> to live in.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> ---
>> v2:
>> - make sure to exclude e820 regions outside the 32-bit memory range.
>
> Do you need to execlude range that is used for initrd and possible
> command_line and boot_param ?

Yeah, and while doing a stress test here, I realized there's another
problem. In the original version of this, the stack and heap are set
up after relocation. In the C port, they're set up before, so there's
even more to avoid. To illustrate... here's a CONFIG_RELOCATABLE=n
boot:

LOAD_PHYS:0x0000000001000000
input: 0x0000000001dfe24d-0x00000000023db865
output: 0x0000000001000000-0x00000000023c98c0
heap: 0x00000000023e0740-0x00000000023e8740
stack: 0x00000000023ec698
chosen: 0x0000000001000000

(stack is just cheating and reporting sp in decompress_kernel)

And a CONFIG_RELOCATABLE=y and "noaslr" boot:

LOAD_PHYS:0x0000000001000000
input: 0x000000000108b25e-0x00000000016b3e96
output: 0x0000000000200000-0x00000000016a1db8
heap: 0x00000000016b9600-0x00000000016c1600
stack: 0x00000000016c5558
chosen: 0x0000000000200000

In that case, it's just so far under LOAD_PHYSICAL_START that it's
safe. But if KASLR picks an area overlapping input, heap, or stack
it's hosed. :)

-Kees

--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security


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