lkml.org 
[lkml]   [2013]   [Apr]   [24]   [last100]   RSS Feed
Views: [wrap][no wrap]   [headers]  [forward] 
 
Messages in this thread
/
Date
SubjectRe: [PATCH v2] kmsg: Honor dmesg_restrict sysctl on /dev/kmsg
From
On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 2:30 PM, Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
> On Wed, Apr 24, 2013 at 1:35 PM, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> wrote:
>>
>> That said, I much prefer doing the privilege test at read time since
>> that means passing a file descriptor to another process doesn't mean
>> the new process can just continue reading.
>
> Bullshit.
>
> That's exactly the wrong kind of thinking. If you had privileges to
> open something, and you pass it off, it's *your* choice.

Yes, this is what I was pointing out originally. The semantics of
/proc/kmsg do exactly that: check at open time, which is much cleaner.

Solving the permissions checking delta between the syslog via syscall
and syslog via /proc/kmsg was the original intent of the code so that
capabilities could be dropped after open. And when /dev/kmsg came
along, it didn't follow either convention. I just want to see the
behavior standardized.

-Kees

--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security


\
 
 \ /
  Last update: 2013-04-25 00:21    [W:0.114 / U:3.188 seconds]
©2003-2020 Jasper Spaans|hosted at Digital Ocean and TransIP|Read the blog|Advertise on this site