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SubjectRe: [PATCH 3/4] capability: Create a new capability CAP_SIGNED
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On Wed, 2013-03-20 at 10:41 -0400, Vivek Goyal wrote:

> I am not sure why CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL(CAP_MODIFY_KERNEL) is any
> different. When secureboot is enabled, kernel will take away that
> capability from all the processes. So kernel became a decision maker
> too whether processes have CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL or not based on
> certain other factors like secureboot is enabled or not.

No, that's a limited case. Outside of that, it's an access control
capability in exactly the same way as CAP_SYS_RAWIO is. The easiest way
to think of this is probably whether it ever makes sense for an
arbitrary binary run as root to possess that capability. For
CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL the answer is yes - for CAP_SIGNED, the answer is
no.

Just have a flag somewhere in the process structure that indicates
whether it was signed. There's no need to use capabilities here.
--
Matthew Garrett | mjg59@srcf.ucam.org
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