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SubjectRe: [PATCH 01/12] Security: Add CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL
On 03/18/2013 02:32 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote:
>
> This means we can return our focus to the kernel. There's currently a number
> of kernel interfaces that permit privileged userspace to modify the running
> kernel. These are currently protected by CAP_SYS_RAWIO, but unfortunately
> the semantics of this capability are poorly defined and it now covers a large
> superset of the desired behaviour.
>

... except it doesn't.

Looking at it in detail, EVERYTHING in CAP_SYS_RAWIO has the possibility
of compromising the kernel, because they let device drivers be bypassed,
which means arbitrary DMA, which means you have everything.

Now, a lot of the abuses of CAP_SYS_RAWIO have clearly been added by
people who had *no bloody clue* what that capability meant, but it
really doesn't change the fact that pretty much if you have
CAP_SYS_RAWIO you have the machine.

So just reject CAP_SYS_RAWIO.

-hpa

--
H. Peter Anvin, Intel Open Source Technology Center
I work for Intel. I don't speak on their behalf.



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