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Subjectuser ns: arbitrary module loading
The rearranging done for user ns has resulted in allowing arbitrary
kernel module loading[1] (i.e. re-introducing a form of CVE-2011-1019)
by what is assumed to be an unprivileged process.

At present, it does look to require at least CAP_SETUID along the way
to set up the uidmap (but things like the setuid helper newuidmap
might soon start providing such a thing by default).

It might be worth examining GRKERNSEC_MODHARDEN in grsecurity, which
examines module symbols to verify that request_module() for a
filesystem only loads a module that defines "register_filesystem"
(among other things).



Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security

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