Messages in this thread |  | | Date | Fri, 8 Feb 2013 12:14:02 -0800 | Subject | Re: [PATCH] x86: Lock down MSR writing in secure boot | From | Kees Cook <> |
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On Fri, Feb 8, 2013 at 11:42 AM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> wrote: > On 02/08/2013 11:18 AM, Kees Cook wrote: >> >> No. CAP_RAWIO is for reading. Writing needs a much stronger check. > > If so, I suspect we need to do this for *all* raw I/O... but I keep > wondering how much more sensitive writing really is than reading.
Well, I think there's a reasonable distinction between systems that expect to strictly enforce user-space/kernel-space separation (CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL) and things that are fiddling with hardware (CAP_SYS_RAWIO).
For example, even things like /dev/mem already have this separation (although it is stronger). You can't open /dev/mem without CAP_SYS_RAWIO, but if you do, you still can't write to RAM in /dev/mem. This might be one of the earliest examples of this distinction, actually.
I think it's likely that after a while, we can convert some of these proposed CAP_COMPROMISE_KERNEL checks in always-deny once we figure out how to deal with those areas more safely.
-Kees
-- Kees Cook Chrome OS Security
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