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Subject[ 55/66] net: sctp: sctp_endpoint_free: zero out secret key data
3.2-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit b5c37fe6e24eec194bb29d22fdd55d73bcc709bf ]

On sctp_endpoint_destroy, previously used sensitive keying material
should be zeroed out before the memory is returned, as we already do
with e.g. auth keys when released.

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <dborkman@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Vlad Yasevich <vyasevic@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk>
---
net/sctp/endpointola.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/sctp/endpointola.c b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
index c8cc24e..dbe5870a 100644
--- a/net/sctp/endpointola.c
+++ b/net/sctp/endpointola.c
@@ -248,6 +248,8 @@ void sctp_endpoint_free(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
/* Final destructor for endpoint. */
static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
{
+ int i;
+
SCTP_ASSERT(ep->base.dead, "Endpoint is not dead", return);

/* Free up the HMAC transform. */
@@ -270,6 +272,9 @@ static void sctp_endpoint_destroy(struct sctp_endpoint *ep)
sctp_inq_free(&ep->base.inqueue);
sctp_bind_addr_free(&ep->base.bind_addr);

+ for (i = 0; i < SCTP_HOW_MANY_SECRETS; ++i)
+ memset(&ep->secret_key[i], 0, SCTP_SECRET_SIZE);
+
/* Remove and free the port */
if (sctp_sk(ep->base.sk)->bind_hash)
sctp_put_port(ep->base.sk);



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