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SubjectRe: [PATCH v2 00/14] Corrections and customization of the SG_IO command whitelist (CVE-2012-4542)
Il 13/02/2013 16:35, Douglas Gilbert ha scritto:
>> Ping? I'm not even sure what tree this should host these patches...
> You are whitelisting SCSI commands so obviously the SCSI tree
> and the patch spills over into the block tree.

Yeah, an Acked-by is in order but it's not clear from whom and for whom.

> Can't see much point in ack-ing the sg changes since most
> of the action is at higher levels.
> The question I have is what existing code will this change
> break (and will I being getting emails from peeved
> developers)?

An unlikely situation is that a vendor-specific command in the "low"
range (i.e. not 0xc0..0xff) conflicted with an MMC command, so it
happened to be enabled. That will now break, but only if executed
without CAP_SYS_RAWIO.

Nothing will change for programs executed with CAP_SYS_RAWIO.

I have not disabled any standards-defined command that used to be
enabled, and on the contrary I enabled a few of them, so this could
potentially lead to less emails from peeved developers, too.

> Is 8 lines of documentation changes enough? My guess is
> that SG_IO ioctl pass-through users will be tripped up
> and it won't be obvious to them to look at
> Documentation/block/queue-sysfs.txt
> for enlightenment; especially if they are using a char
> device node from the bsg, sg or st drivers to issue SG_IO.

The command whitelist was not documented before. It's quite likely that
any documentation except the code itself would not be updated the next
time the whitelist is touched.


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