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SubjectRe: [RFC Part1 PATCH 00/20 v2] Add namespace support for audit
On 12/11/2013 04:36 AM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Eric Paris (
>> On Tue, 2013-12-10 at 10:51 -0600, Serge Hallyn wrote:
>>> Quoting Gao feng (
>>>> On 12/10/2013 02:26 AM, Serge Hallyn wrote:
>>>>> Quoting Gao feng (
>>>>>> On 12/07/2013 06:12 AM, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>>>>>>> Quoting Gao feng (
>>>>>>>> Hi
>>>>>>>> On 10/24/2013 03:31 PM, Gao feng wrote:
>>>>>>>>> Here is the v1 patchset:
>>>>>>>>> The main target of this patchset is allowing user in audit
>>>>>>>>> namespace to generate the USER_MSG type of audit message,
>>>>>>>>> some userspace tools need to generate audit message, or
>>>>>>>>> these tools will broken.
>>>>>>>> I really need this feature, right now,some process such as
>>>>>>>> logind are broken in container becase we leak of this feature.
>>>>>>> Your set doesn't address loginuid though right? How exactly do you
>>>>>>> expect to do that? If user violates MAC policy and audit msg is
>>>>>>> sent to init user ns by mac subsys, you need the loginuid from
>>>>>>> init_audit_ns. where will that be stored if you allow updates
>>>>>>> of loginuid in auditns?
>>>>>> This patchset doesn't include the loginuid part.
>>>>>> the loginuid is stored in task as before.
>>>>>> In my opinion, when task creates a new audit namespace, this task's
>>>>>> loginuid will be reset to zero, so the children tasks can set their
>>>>>> loginuid. Does this change break the MAC?
>>>>> I think so, yes. In an LSPP selinux environment, if the task
>>>>> manages to trigger an selinux deny rule which is audited, then
>>>>> the loginuid must make sense on the host. Now presumably it
>>>>> will get translated to the mapped host uid, and we can figure
>>>>> out the host uid owning it through /etc/subuid. But that adds
>>>>> /etc/subuid as a new part of the TCB without any warning <shrug>
>>>>> So in that sense, for LSPP, it breaks it.
>>>> Looks like my opinion is incorrect.
>>>> In the audit-next tree, Eric added a new audit feature to allow privileged
>>>> is disabled, the privileged user can reset/set the loginuid of task. I
>>>> think this way is safe since only privileged user can do the change.
>>>> So I will not change the loginuid part.
>>>> Thanks for your information Serge :)
>>> Unfortunately this makes the patchset much less compelling :) The
>>> problem I was looking into is that a container running in a user
>>> namespace cannot (bc he has ns_capable(CAP_AUDIT_*) but not
>>> capable(CAP_AUDIT_*)) set loginuids at all.
>>> Which from an LSPP pov is correct; which is why I was hoping you were
>>> going to have the audit namespaces be hierarchical, with a task in a
>>> level 2 audit ns having two loginuids - one in his own auditns, and
>>> one in the initial one.
>> Right now user namespace + audit is just total crud. We all know
>> this... (I'm not sure pid is must better, but I digress) All thoughts
>> around loginuid in the kernel right this very moment only make sense in
>> the initial user namespace and all permission checks are in the initial
>> user namespace as well.
>> I think I'm a proponent of the hierarchical approach to audit
>> namespaces. An audit namespace would hold a reference to the
>> pid/user/whatever namespace it was created in/with. Each audit
>> namespace should have it's own set of filter rules, etc. Instead of
>> just storing 'loginuid' we store 'loginuid+user namespace'. When the
> So long as the kernel stores the kuid_t (which the only sane thing to
> do) that is a non-issue.
>> kernel creates a record it should translate the loginuid to the
>> namespace of the audit namespace and send the record.
> Yup, that should go without saying. Use kuid_t in kernel and translate
> at the kernel-user boundary.

I can implement audit namespace as a hierarchy, give per auditns a level value
and a pointer which point to parent auditns.

but for the loginuid part, I think we can implement it after we push the audit
ns into the upstream.

Is this ok?
>> It's a pretty major rewrite, but at least it makes sense. Things like
>> AVC's might show up in multiple audit logs, but in every log they would
>> make sense to the admin of that namespace...
>> But what the hell do I know...
> Exactly how it would all affect selinux. I'm happy it seems we agree.

This idea looks good to me, I will Investigate this. :)


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