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SubjectRe: [PATCH 1/9] Known exploit detection
Am 13.12.2013 02:42, schrieb Greg Kroah-Hartman:
> On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 07:25:23PM -0500, Dave Jones wrote:
>> On Thu, Dec 12, 2013 at 01:13:41PM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
>> > - who will keep adding these triggers going forward?
>> also..
>> - Who will test the existing triggers are doing the right thing when related code changes.
> And:
> - how do you determine an "expoit attempt" from "userspace program
> doing something stupid" / "corrupted filesytem mounted"?

And what makes a bug marked as exploit more serious than the all the
other bugs? I assume there exists many, many more serious (fixed or not)
bugs than just those which found there way into the CVE database. And I
think most bugs are getting fixed without such a number and often even
those for which CVEs do exist, the CVE is unknown to the dev(s).

So people might be think they are safe if they call some tool which
tests for existing CVEs which are marked as such inside the kernel,
which just isn't the reality.

And, as already mentioned, those CVE marks might block refactoring, as
devs might become careful to remove such a CVE marker when code changed.

I've never seen a comment inside the kernel sources which does point to
a CVE, so I assume there already does exists some agreement about not
doing so.


Alexander Holler

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