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SubjectRe: [REVIEW][PATCH 1/2] userns: Better restrictions on when proc and sysfs can be mounted
On 11/09/2013 01:42 PM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
> Gao feng <gaofeng@cn.fujitsu.com> writes:
>
>> On 11/02/2013 02:06 PM, Gao feng wrote:
>>> Hi Eric,
>>>
>>> On 08/28/2013 05:44 AM, Eric W. Biederman wrote:
>>>>
>>>> Rely on the fact that another flavor of the filesystem is already
>>>> mounted and do not rely on state in the user namespace.
>>>>
>>>> Verify that the mounted filesystem is not covered in any significant
>>>> way. I would love to verify that the previously mounted filesystem
>>>> has no mounts on top but there are at least the directories
>>>> /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc and /sys/fs/cgroup/ that exist explicitly
>>>> for other filesystems to mount on top of.
>>>>
>>>> Refactor the test into a function named fs_fully_visible and call that
>>>> function from the mount routines of proc and sysfs. This makes this
>>>> test local to the filesystems involved and the results current of when
>>>> the mounts take place, removing a weird threading of the user
>>>> namespace, the mount namespace and the filesystems themselves.
>>>>
>>>> Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
>>>> ---
>>>> fs/namespace.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
>>>> fs/proc/root.c | 7 +++++--
>>>> fs/sysfs/mount.c | 3 ++-
>>>> include/linux/fs.h | 1 +
>>>> include/linux/user_namespace.h | 4 ----
>>>> kernel/user.c | 2 --
>>>> kernel/user_namespace.c | 2 --
>>>> 7 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c
>>>> index 64627f8..877e427 100644
>>>> --- a/fs/namespace.c
>>>> +++ b/fs/namespace.c
>>>> @@ -2867,25 +2867,38 @@ bool current_chrooted(void)
>>>> return chrooted;
>>>> }
>>>>
>>>> -void update_mnt_policy(struct user_namespace *userns)
>>>> +bool fs_fully_visible(struct file_system_type *type)
>>>> {
>>>> struct mnt_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->mnt_ns;
>>>> struct mount *mnt;
>>>> + bool visible = false;
>>>>
>>>> - down_read(&namespace_sem);
>>>> + if (unlikely(!ns))
>>>> + return false;
>>>> +
>>>> + namespace_lock();
>>>> list_for_each_entry(mnt, &ns->list, mnt_list) {
>>>> - switch (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_magic) {
>>>> - case SYSFS_MAGIC:
>>>> - userns->may_mount_sysfs = true;
>>>> - break;
>>>> - case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
>>>> - userns->may_mount_proc = true;
>>>> - break;
>>>> + struct mount *child;
>>>> + if (mnt->mnt.mnt_sb->s_type != type)
>>>> + continue;
>>>> +
>>>> + /* This mount is not fully visible if there are any child mounts
>>>> + * that cover anything except for empty directories.
>>>> + */
>>>> + list_for_each_entry(child, &mnt->mnt_mounts, mnt_child) {
>>>> + struct inode *inode = child->mnt_mountpoint->d_inode;
>>>> + if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode))
>>>> + goto next;
>>>> + if (inode->i_nlink != 2)
>>>> + goto next;
>>>
>>>
>>> I met a problem that proc filesystem failed to mount in user namespace,
>>> The problem is the i_nlink of sysctl entries under proc filesystem is not
>>> 2. it always is 1 even it's a directory, see proc_sys_make_inode. and for
>>> btrfs, the i_nlink for an empty dir is 2 too. it seems like depends on the
>>> filesystem itself,not depends on vfs. In my system binfmt_misc is mounted
>>> on /proc/sys/fs/binfmt_misc, and the i_nlink of this directory's inode is
>>> 1.
>
> Yes. 1 is what filesystems that are too lazy to count the number of
> links to a directory return, and /proc/sys is currently such a
> filesystem.
>
> Ordinarily nlink == 2 means a directory does not have any subdirectories.
>
>>> btw, I'm not quite understand what's the inode->i_nlink != 2 here means?
>>> is this directory empty? as I know, when we create a file(not dir) under
>>> a dir, the i_nlink of this dir will not increase.
>>>
>>> And another question, it looks like if we don't have proc/sys fs mounted,
>>> then proc/sys will be failed to be mounted?
>>>
>>
>> Any Idea?? or should we need to revert this patch??
>
> The patch is mostly doing what it is supposed to be doing.
>
> Now the code is slightly buggy. inode->i_nlink will test to see if a
> directory has subdirectories but it won't test to see if a directory is
> empty. Where did my brain go when I was writing that test?
>
> Right now I would rather not have the empty directory exception than
> remove this code.
>
> The test is a little trickier to write than it might otherwise be
> because /proc and /sys tend to be slightly imperfect filesystems.
>
> I think the only way to really test that is to call readdir on the
> directory itself :( I don't like that thought.
>
> I don't know what I was thinking when I wrote that test but I definitely
> goofed up. Grr!
>
> I can certainly filter out any directory with nlink > 2. That would be
> an easy partial step forward.
>
> The real question though is how do I detect directories it is safe to
> mount on where there will not be files in them. I can't call iterate
> with the namespace_lock held so things are a bit tricky.
>

I know this problem is not easy to be resolved. why not let the user
make the decision? maybe we can introduce a new mount option MS_LOCK,
if user wants to use mount to hide something, he should use mount with
option MS_LOCK. so the unpriviged user can't umount this filesystem and
fail to mount the filesystem if one of it's child mount is mounted with
MS_LOCK option otherwise he use MS_REC too.

Thanks


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