Messages in this thread |  | | From | Rusty Russell <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] MODSIGN: Don't taint unless signature enforcing is enabled | Date | Mon, 07 Jan 2013 11:39:47 +1030 |
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Josh Boyer <jwboyer@redhat.com> writes: > With module signing enabled but not in enforcing mode, we don't consider > unsigned modules to be an error. However, we only mark sig_ok as true if > a signature verified. This causes the module to be tainted with the > TAINT_FORCED_MODULE flag.
Wait, what? So, what does CONFIG_MODULE_SIG=y with MODULE_SIG_FORCE=n mean? Why not just call that CONFIG_USELESS_BLOAT? :)
> That in turn taints the kernel, which also disables lockdep.
Yeah, lockdep is oversensitive. This has been argued before, take it up with Ingo. Perhaps we need a taint flag bit to indicate that lockdep should actually be disabled?
> Tainting the module and kernel when we don't consider something to be an > error seems excessive. This marks sig_ok as true if we aren't in enforcing > mode.
If we were to do this, please follow Plauger's Law: "Don't patch bad code - rewrite it."
In this case, rip out the now-useless sig_ok field.
Thanks, Rusty.
> diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c > index 250092c..a50172e 100644 > --- a/kernel/module.c > +++ b/kernel/module.c > @@ -2443,8 +2443,10 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info) > if (err < 0 && fips_enabled) > panic("Module verification failed with error %d in FIPS mode\n", > err); > - if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce) > + if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce) { > + info->sig_ok = true; > err = 0; > + } > > return err; > } > -- > 1.8.0.1
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