Messages in this thread | | | Date | Fri, 11 Jan 2013 08:49:00 -0500 | Subject | Re: [PATCH] MODSIGN: Warn when sign check fails due to -ENOKEY | From | Josh Boyer <> |
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On Fri, Jan 11, 2013 at 4:44 AM, Chris Samuel <chris@csamuel.org> wrote: > /* Please CC me in responses, I am not subscribed to LKML */ > > Currently if a signature check fails on module load due to not having > the appropriate key (-ENOKEY) and we are not doing strict checking > there is no information provided to the user other than the lock debug > taint warning: > > Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint > > This patch causes a single warning to be emitted to explain why the > kernel is being tainted, before the above taint warning occurs. > > Module verification failed, required key not present, tainting kernel > > Found whilst trying to work out why all the 3.8 development kernels > I was building and testing were warning about taints and why all modules > were listed as forced load (F) in /proc/modules when that wasn't the > case in the 3.5, 3.6 or 3.7 kernels I'd tried. > > Signed-off-by: Christopher Samuel <chris@csamuel.org> > --- > kernel/module.c | 4 +++- > 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c > index 250092c..27de534 100644 > --- a/kernel/module.c > +++ b/kernel/module.c > @@ -2443,8 +2443,10 @@ static int module_sig_check(struct load_info *info) > if (err < 0 && fips_enabled) > panic("Module verification failed with error %d in FIPS > mode\n", > err); > - if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce) > + if (err == -ENOKEY && !sig_enforce) { > + printk_once(KERN_DEBUG "Module verification failed, required > key not present, tainting kernel\n"); > err = 0; > + } > return err;
I'd suggest putting the printk in load_module where we call the add_taint_module function instead. Also, you might want to make the priority a bit higher if it's meant to be informative. Something like KERN_INFO.
josh
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