Messages in this thread | | | From | "Eric W. Biederman" <> | Date | Fri, 03 Aug 2012 06:07:36 -0700 | Subject | Re: [PATCH] Forbid invocation of kexec_load() outside initial PID namespace |
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"Daniel P. Berrange" <berrange@redhat.com> wrote:
>On Fri, Aug 03, 2012 at 05:45:40AM -0700, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> The solution is to use user namespaces and to only test ns_capable on >the magic reboot path. >> >> For the 3.7 timeframe that should be a realistic solution. > >Hmm, that would imply that if LXC wants to allow reboot()/CAP_SYS_BOOT >they will be forced to use CLONE_NEWUSER. I was rather looking for a >way >to allow the container to keep CAP_SYS_BOOT, without also mandating use >of user namespaces.
If we remove the use of CAP_SYS_BOOT on the container reboot path perhaps.
But you have hit one small issue in the huge pile of issues why giving contaners capabilities is generally a bad idea.
This is the reason I have been insisting on a reasonable version of user namespaces for a long time.
When the security issues become important it is time for user namespaces. That is their purpose.
Eric
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