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SubjectRe: [tip:core/locking] futex: Do not leak robust list to unprivileged process
On 06/19/2012 11:13 AM, Serge Hallyn wrote:
> Quoting Wanlong Gao (gaowanlong@cn.fujitsu.com):
>> On 06/19/2012 10:24 AM, Serge Hallyn wrote:
>>> Quoting Wanlong Gao (gaowanlong@cn.fujitsu.com):
>>>> On 03/29/2012 05:55 PM, tip-bot for Kees Cook wrote:
>>>>> Commit-ID: bdbb776f882f5ad431aa1e694c69c1c3d6a4a5b8
>>>>> Gitweb: http://git.kernel.org/tip/bdbb776f882f5ad431aa1e694c69c1c3d6a4a5b8
>>>>> Author: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>>>>> AuthorDate: Mon, 19 Mar 2012 16:12:53 -0700
>>>>> Committer: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>>>>> CommitDate: Thu, 29 Mar 2012 11:37:17 +0200
>>>>>
>>>>> futex: Do not leak robust list to unprivileged process
>>>>>
>>>>> It was possible to extract the robust list head address from a setuid
>>>>> process if it had used set_robust_list(), allowing an ASLR info leak. This
>>>>> changes the permission checks to be the same as those used for similar
>>>>> info that comes out of /proc.
>>>>>
>>>>> Running a setuid program that uses robust futexes would have had:
>>>>> cred->euid != pcred->euid
>>>>> cred->euid == pcred->uid
>>>>> so the old permissions check would allow it. I'm not aware of any setuid
>>>>> programs that use robust futexes, so this is just a preventative measure.
>>>>>
>>>>
>>>> I'm not sure this change prevents the unprivileged process.
>>>> Please refer to LTP test, recently I saw that this change broke
>>>> the following test.
>>>>
>>>> https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp/blob/master/testcases/kernel/syscalls/get_robust_list/get_robust_list01.c#L155
>>>> if (seteuid(1) == -1)
>>>> tst_brkm(TBROK|TERRNO, cleanup, "seteuid(1) failed");
>>>>
>>>> TEST(retval = syscall(__NR_get_robust_list, 1,
>>>> (struct robust_list_head *)&head,
>>>> &len_ptr));
>>>>
>>>> We set the euid to an unprivileged user, and expect to FAIL with EPERM,
>>>> without this patch, it FAIL as we expected, but with it, this call succeed.
>>>
>>> This relates to a question I asked - I believe in this thread, maybe in
>>> another thread - about ptrace_may_access. That code goes back further than
>>> our git history, and for so long has used current->uid and ->gid, not
>>> euid and gid, for permission checks. I asked if that's what we really
>>> want, but at the same am not sure we want to change something that's
>>> been like that for so long.
>>>
>>> But that's why it succeeded - you changed your euid, not your uid.
>>
>> Yeah, I known what I'm doing.
>
> Didn't mean to offend :)

Sorry for my poor words, I didn't mean that, either. ;)

>
>> I just wonder which is the right thing.
>> Should we check euid or uid ? You mean that checking uid instead of
>> checking euid for a long time, right?
>
> Yup, and I agree it seems wrong.

Are there any other places where also switch checking uid instead of euid ?
In this place, anyway, this syscall is already marked as deprecated.

Thanks,
Wanlong Gao

>
> -serge
>




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