Messages in this thread | | | From | Andrew Lutomirski <> | Date | Fri, 6 Apr 2012 13:01:17 -0700 | Subject | Re: [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs |
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On Fri, Apr 6, 2012 at 12:55 PM, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> wrote: > On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:46 -0500 > Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote: > >> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> >> >> With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc) >> become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of >> subverting privileged binaries. > > The changelog doesn't explain the semantics of the new syscall. > There's a comment way-down-there which I guess suffices, if you hunt > for it. > > And the changelog doesn't explain why this is being added. Presumably > seccomp_filter wants/needs this feature but whowhatwherewhenwhy? Spell > it all out, please. > > The new syscall mode will be documented in the prctl manpage. Please > cc linux-man@vger.kernel.org and work with Michael on getting this > done?
This has been bugging me for awhile. Is there any interest in moving the manpages into the kernel source tree? Then there could be a general requirement that new APIs get documented when they're written.
(There are plenty of barely- or incompletely-documented syscalls. futex and relatives come to mind.)
--Andy -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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