Messages in this thread | | | From | Andy Lutomirski <> | Date | Fri, 6 Apr 2012 12:55:14 -0700 | Subject | Re: [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs |
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On Fri, Apr 6, 2012 at 12:49 PM, Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org> wrote: > On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:46 -0500 > Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote: > >> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> >> >> With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc) >> become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of >> subverting privileged binaries. >> >> This patch completely breaks apparmor. Someone who understands (and >> uses) apparmor should fix it or at least give me a hint. > > So [patch 2/15] fixes all this up? > > I guess we should join the two patches into one, to avoid a silly > breakage window. That means that John loses a brownie point, but we > can mention him in the changelog, include his signed-off-by:
Or just fix the commit message. It no longer completely breaks AppArmor. It just causes execve to fail when PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS is set and AppArmor is in use.
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