| Date | Fri, 6 Apr 2012 12:55:17 -0700 | From | Andrew Morton <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH v17 01/15] Add PR_{GET,SET}_NO_NEW_PRIVS to prevent execve from granting privs |
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On Thu, 29 Mar 2012 15:01:46 -0500 Will Drewry <wad@chromium.org> wrote:
> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net> > > With this set, a lot of dangerous operations (chroot, unshare, etc) > become a lot less dangerous because there is no possibility of > subverting privileged binaries.
The changelog doesn't explain the semantics of the new syscall. There's a comment way-down-there which I guess suffices, if you hunt for it.
And the changelog doesn't explain why this is being added. Presumably seccomp_filter wants/needs this feature but whowhatwherewhenwhy? Spell it all out, please.
The new syscall mode will be documented in the prctl manpage. Please cc linux-man@vger.kernel.org and work with Michael on getting this done?
> > ... >
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