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SubjectRe: [PATCH 30/43] userns: Fail exec for suid and sgid binaries with ids outside our user namespace.
Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
> "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
>
> > Quoting Eric W. Beiderman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
> >> From: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
> >>
> >
> > Oh, perhaps this is the right place in the thread to discuss the issue of
> > what to do with file capabilities? I'm ok waiting until the next iteration
> > to even discuss it, so long as we start by refusing setting of fcaps by
> > any task not in init_user_ns.
>
> For now we do refuse all callers in the init_user_ns because that path
> is protected by a capable and not an ns_capable call.
>
> And as a general policy I have pushed all of the changes from capable to
> ns_capable out till after we get these other user namespace bits so we
> can get the patches reviewed so hopefully don't enable something that is
> not safe.
>
> Let's just note here that when we ever get a filesystem mounted in
> something other than the init_user_ns or otherwise allow file
> capabilities that do not belong to the init_user_ns we need to an
> additional exec check to avoid a security issue for processes in the
> init_user_ns using those credentials.
>
> The other direction the init_user_ns setting file caps on a file and use
> using them in a child namespace seems safe, and practical because of the
> way we handle capabilities. Aka if you have a capability in an outer
> user namespace you also have it in a child user namespace. Which means
> a file cap exec today will give you just the capabilities in the child
> user namespace.
>
> Something else to think about when we reach filesystems mounted in
> different user namespaces (aka unprivileged mounts) are security
> labels on files in different user namespaces. Not any kind of immediate
> concern but something we may have to handle eventually.

An interesting concern to discuss at the security mini-summit (or just
at the UDS session).

-serge


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