| From | Paul Gortmaker <> | Subject | [34-longterm 173/196] CIFS: Fix memory over bound bug in cifs_parse_mount_options | Date | Mon, 12 Mar 2012 20:21:26 -0400 |
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From: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru>
------------------- This is a commit scheduled for the next v2.6.34 longterm release. If you see a problem with using this for longterm, please comment. -------------------
commit 4906e50b37e6f6c264e7ee4237343eb2b7f8d16d upstream.
While password processing we can get out of options array bound if the next character after array is delimiter. The patch adds a check if we reach the end.
Signed-off-by: Pavel Shilovsky <piastry@etersoft.ru> Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: Steve French <sfrench@us.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Paul Gortmaker <paul.gortmaker@windriver.com> --- fs/cifs/connect.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/cifs/connect.c b/fs/cifs/connect.c index f6afb59..cebbc29 100644 --- a/fs/cifs/connect.c +++ b/fs/cifs/connect.c @@ -800,8 +800,7 @@ static int cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, const char *devname, struct smb_vol *vol) { - char *value; - char *data; + char *value, *data, *end; unsigned int temp_len, i, j; char separator[2]; short int override_uid = -1; @@ -844,6 +843,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, const char *devname, if (!options) return 1; + end = options + strlen(options); if (strncmp(options, "sep=", 4) == 0) { if (options[4] != 0) { separator[0] = options[4]; @@ -908,6 +908,7 @@ cifs_parse_mount_options(char *options, const char *devname, the only illegal character in a password is null */ if ((value[temp_len] == 0) && + (value + temp_len < end) && (value[temp_len+1] == separator[0])) { /* reinsert comma */ value[temp_len] = separator[0]; -- 1.7.9.3
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