Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | Date | Mon, 12 Mar 2012 01:44:23 +0100 | From | Willy Tarreau <> | Subject | [ 12/13] relay: prevent integer overflow in relay_open() |
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2.6.27-longterm review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com>
commit f6302f1bcd75a042df69866d98b8d775a668f8f1 upstream.
"subbuf_size" and "n_subbufs" come from the user and they need to be capped to prevent an integer overflow.
Signed-off-by: Dan Carpenter <dan.carpenter@oracle.com> Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk> Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> --- kernel/relay.c | 10 ++++++++-- 1 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/relay.c b/kernel/relay.c index 760c262..bf343f5 100644 --- a/kernel/relay.c +++ b/kernel/relay.c @@ -171,10 +171,14 @@ depopulate: */ static struct rchan_buf *relay_create_buf(struct rchan *chan) { - struct rchan_buf *buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rchan_buf), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!buf) + struct rchan_buf *buf; + + if (chan->n_subbufs > UINT_MAX / sizeof(size_t *)) return NULL; + buf = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rchan_buf), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!buf) + return NULL; buf->padding = kmalloc(chan->n_subbufs * sizeof(size_t *), GFP_KERNEL); if (!buf->padding) goto free_buf; @@ -581,6 +585,8 @@ struct rchan *relay_open(const char *base_filename, if (!(subbuf_size && n_subbufs)) return NULL; + if (subbuf_size > UINT_MAX / n_subbufs) + return NULL; chan = kzalloc(sizeof(struct rchan), GFP_KERNEL); if (!chan) -- 1.7.2.1.45.g54fbc
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