| Date | Mon, 03 Dec 2012 14:32:08 +0000 | From | Ben Hutchings <> | Subject | [ 22/89] netfilter: Validate the sequence number of dataless ACK packets as well |
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3.2-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
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From: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu>
commit 4a70bbfaef0361d27272629d1a250a937edcafe4 upstream.
We spare nothing by not validating the sequence number of dataless ACK packets and enabling it makes harder off-path attacks.
See: "Reflection scan: an Off-Path Attack on TCP" by Jan Wrobel, http://arxiv.org/abs/1201.2074
Signed-off-by: Jozsef Kadlecsik <kadlec@blackhole.kfki.hu> Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org> Signed-off-by: Ben Hutchings <ben@decadent.org.uk> --- net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c | 10 ++-------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c index 1eb458c..a9d5f50 100644 --- a/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c +++ b/net/netfilter/nf_conntrack_proto_tcp.c @@ -625,15 +625,9 @@ static bool tcp_in_window(const struct nf_conn *ct, ack = sack = receiver->td_end; } - if (seq == end - && (!tcph->rst - || (seq == 0 && state->state == TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT))) + if (tcph->rst && seq == 0 && state->state == TCP_CONNTRACK_SYN_SENT) /* - * Packets contains no data: we assume it is valid - * and check the ack value only. - * However RST segments are always validated by their - * SEQ number, except when seq == 0 (reset sent answering - * SYN. + * RST sent answering SYN. */ seq = end = sender->td_end;
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