Messages in this thread | | | From | (Eric W. Biederman) | Date | Fri, 14 Dec 2012 14:32:12 -0800 | Subject | Re: [RFC][PATCH] Fix cap_capable to only allow owners in the parent user namespace to have caps. |
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"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com> writes:
> Quoting Eric W. Biederman (ebiederm@xmission.com):
>> A child user namespace having capabilities against processes in it's >> parent seems totally bizarre and pretty dangerous from a capabilities >> standpoint. > > How would it have them against its parent?
init_user_ns userns a --- created by kuid 1 userns b -- created by kuid 2 process c in userns b with kuid 1
Serge read the first permisison check in common_cap. Think what happens in the above example.
For the rest I understand your concern.
Serge please read and look at the patches I have posted to fix the issues Andy found with the user namespace tree. Especially the fix to commit_creds.
After you have looked at the patches to fix the issues I will be happy to discuss things further with you.
Eric
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