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SubjectRe: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
Date
* James Bottomley:

> Right, but what I'm telling you is that by deciding to allow automatic
> first boot, you're causing the windows attack vector problem. You could
> easily do a present user test only on first boot which would eliminate
> it.

Apparently, the warning will look like this:

WARNING: This Binary is unsigned

Are you sure you wish to run an unsigned binary
in a secure environment?

To avoid this question in future place the platform into setup mode
See http://www.linuxfoundation.org/uefi-setup-mode
And reboot.

I'm not convinced this will work because users will confirm their
presence to get back into the system. We expect GNU/Linux users to do
it, why wouldn't Windows users? (And what harm can an unsigned binary
do to a "secure environment", anyway? If it's adversely affected, it
can't be that secure, can it?)

And what's the backup plan if users use this to boot into compromised
Windows systems?


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