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SubjectRe: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
On Mon, 5 Nov 2012, Jiri Kosina wrote:

> Do I understand you correctly that by the 'glue' stuff you actually mean
> the division of the kexec image into segments?
>
> Of course, when we are dividing the image into segments and then passing
> those individually (even more so if some transformations are performed on
> those segments, which I don't know whether that's the case or not), then
> we can't do any signature verification of the image any more.
>
> But I still don't fully understand what is so magical about taking the
> kernel image as is, and passing the whole lot to the running kernel as-is,
> allowing for signature verification.
>
> Yes, it couldn't be sys_kexec_load(), as that would be ABI breakage, so
> it'd mean sys_kexec_raw_load(), or whatever ... but I fail to see why that
> would be problem in principle.
>
> If you can point me to the code where all the magic that prevents this
> easy handling is happening, I'd appreciate it.

OK, so after wandering through kexec-tools sources for a while, I am
starting to get your point. I wasn't actually aware of the fact that it
supports such a wide variety of binary formats etc. (multiboot, nbi, etc).

I had a naive idea of just putting in-kernel verification of a complete
ELF binary passed to kernel by userspace, and if the signature matches,
jumping to it.
Would work for elf-x86_64 nicely I guess, but we'd lose a lot of other
functionality currently being provided by kexec-tools.

Bah. This is a real pandora's box.

--
Jiri Kosina
SUSE Labs


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