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SubjectRe: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
On Thu 2012-11-01 15:02:25, Chris Friesen wrote:
> On 11/01/2012 02:27 PM, Pavel Machek wrote:
> >Could someone write down exact requirements for Linux kernel to be signed by Microsoft?
> >Because thats apparently what you want, and I don't think crippling kexec/suspend is
> >enough.
> As I understand it, the kernel won't be signed by Microsoft.

> Rather, the bootloader will be signed by Microsoft and the vendors
> will be the ones that refuse to sign a kernel unless it is
> reasonably assured that it won't be used as an attack vector.

Yes. So can someone write down what "used as an attack vector" means?

Because, AFAICT, Linux kernel is _designed_ to work as an attact
vector. We intentionally support wine, and want to keep that support.

> With secure boot enabled, then the kernel should refuse to let an
> unsigned kexec load new images, and kexec itself should refuse to
> load unsigned images. Also the kernel would need to sign its
> "suspend-to-disk" images and refuse to resume unsigned images.

I believe that attacking Windows using wine is easier than using

(cesky, pictures)

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