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SubjectRe: [RFC] Second attempt at kernel secure boot support
On 11/01/2012 02:27 PM, Pavel Machek wrote:

> Could someone write down exact requirements for Linux kernel to be signed by Microsoft?
> Because thats apparently what you want, and I don't think crippling kexec/suspend is
> enough.

As I understand it, the kernel won't be signed by Microsoft.

Rather, the bootloader will be signed by Microsoft and the vendors will
be the ones that refuse to sign a kernel unless it is reasonably assured
that it won't be used as an attack vector.

If you want fully-open behaviour it's still possible, you just need to
turn off secure boot.

With secure boot enabled, then the kernel should refuse to let an
unsigned kexec load new images, and kexec itself should refuse to load
unsigned images. Also the kernel would need to sign its
"suspend-to-disk" images and refuse to resume unsigned images.

Presumably the signing key for the "suspend-to-disk" images would need
to be stored somewhere that is not accessable even by root. It's not
clear to me how we would do this, but maybe it's possible with hardware


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