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SubjectRe: unprivileged mounts git tree
Quoting Miklos Szeredi (miklos@szeredi.hu):
> On Thu, 4 Sep 2008, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > We still have the original problem.
> >
> > When root does
> >
> > mount -bind /mnt /mnt
> > mount --make-rshared /mnt
> > mount --bind -o user=hallyn /mnt /home/hallyn/mnt
> >
> > and hallyn does
> >
> > mount --bind /usr /home/hallyn/mnt/usr
> >
> > then the kernel happily propagates the mount to /mnt/usr.
>
> Obviously, and that's exactly what root _instructed_ in the last step.
> If it's a security problem, root shouldn't do that.
>
> Your original bug report correctly pointed out the real security
> problem:
>
> | as root:
> | mmount --bind -o user=500 /home/hallyn/etc/ /home/hallyn/etc/
> | mount --bind /mnt /mnt
> | mount --make-rshared /mnt
> | mount --bind /dev /mnt/dev
> |
> | as hallyn:
> | mmount --bind /mnt /home/hallyn/etc/mnt
> | /usr/src/mmount-0.3/mmount --bind mnt/dev mnt/src
>
> Here root does nothing "unsafe", yet the user can get propagation back
> into /mnt, due to the fact that a bind mount makes the new mount part
> of the old peer group. This is the security hole that is fixed, and
> AFAICS the only security hole related to propagation vs. user mounts.
>
> (I'm going to be offline tomorrow and the weekend, but will hopefully
> have email access next week).
>
> Thanks,
> Miklos

(&(*$&%, you're right, of course.

Ok, will play with it a bit more, but I think it'd be *great* to see
this show up in -mm again.

-serge


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