Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 5 Aug 2008 18:29:44 +0100 | From | Alan Cox <> | Subject | Re: [malware-list] [RFC 0/5] [TALPA] Intro to a linux interfaceforon access scanning |
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> And this can be done from userland with the preload: the "workaround" > from the preload assumes you've already executed malicious code, which > is outside of your protection scope. > > What am I missing?
Scripts Attempts to screen content Exec occuring after ld.so is compromised
Is there anything however that cannot be done with SELinux if you added the ability to block an open and kick it upwards (including the open of an exec binary)
It seems you would then get a transition from a label of 'trusted' to 'untrusted_unverified' and an open of untrusted_unverified can (depending on the SELinux rule) then block, trap upwards and continue according to a userspace response.
At that point all the questions like 'what do I want to scan for' become SELinux questions and we already have all the technology to do stuff like 'only scan for samba' or 'only scan for httpd and cgi' and do it efficiently.
The cache then becomes the labels which are already part of the fs and our existing labelling and context management.
Alan
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