Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 30 Oct 2008 10:29:40 -0500 | From | "Serge E. Hallyn" <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH -v1 1/3] SECURITY: new capable_noaudit interface |
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Quoting Eric Paris (eparis@redhat.com): > Add a new capable interface that will be used by systems that use audit to > make an A or B type decision instead of a security decision. Currently > this is the case at least for filesystems when deciding if a process can use > the reserved 'root' blocks and for the case of things like the oom > algorithm determining if processes are root processes and should be less > likely to be killed. These types of security system requests should not be > audited or logged since they are not really security decisions. It would be > possible to solve this problem like the vm_enough_memory security check did > by creating a new LSM interface and moving all of the policy into that > interface but proves the needlessly bloat the LSM and provide complex > indirection. > > This merely allows those decisions to be made where they belong and to not > flood logs or printk with denials for thing that are not security decisions. > > Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
Please introduce some meaningful defines instead of passing 0 and 1. I.e.
#define CAP_NOAUDIT 0 #define CAP_AUDIT 1
Otherwise, looks fine.
thanks, -serge
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