Messages in this thread | | | From | Andreas Schwab <> | Subject | Re: O_NOLINK for open() | Date | Wed, 12 Sep 2007 23:42:37 +0200 |
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Brent Casavant <bcasavan@sgi.com> writes:
> I could mmap a temporary tmpfs file (tmpfs so that if there is a > machine crash no sensitive data persists) which is created with > permissions of 0, immediately unlink it, and pass the file > descriptor through an AF_UNIX socket. This does open up a very > small window of vulnerability if another process is able to chmod > the file and open it before the unlink.
Only the owner can chmod a file, so why is that a vulnerability?
Andreas.
-- Andreas Schwab, SuSE Labs, schwab@suse.de SuSE Linux Products GmbH, Maxfeldstraße 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany PGP key fingerprint = 58CA 54C7 6D53 942B 1756 01D3 44D5 214B 8276 4ED5 "And now for something completely different." - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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