Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 28 Jun 2007 18:19:44 +0000 | From | Pavel Machek <> | Subject | Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching |
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Hi!
One more...
> 2. This is argument #1 in a different guise and I find it about as weak. > Pathname-based access control has strengths and weaknesses. I think > users and Linux distributions are in a better position to evaluate those > tradeoffs than L-K. Competition is good.
It took you quite a lot of time to realize AA does not do IPC (and all the implications of that). I do not think Linux _users_ can do informed decision here. Novell marketing did too good job here.
Heck, even I am not sure if I understand the implications of not doing IPC confinement. Is shared memory commonly used in a way that allows exploiting? I know it is a problem, and you probably could kill init from hacked apache..... but what would you do to break out of jail?
Pavel (please cc me) -- (english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek (cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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