Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sun, 24 Jun 2007 12:18:52 -0400 (EDT) | From | James Morris <> | Subject | Re: implement-file-posix-capabilities.patch |
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On Sun, 24 Jun 2007, Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
> > 2) Allocate capability bit-31 for CAP_SETFCAP, and use it to gate > > whether the user can set this xattr on a file or not. CAP_SYS_ADMIN is > > way too overloaded and this functionality is special. > > The functionality is special, but someone with CAP_SYS_ADMIN can always > unload the capability module and create the security.capability xattr > using the dummy module. > > If we do add this cap, do we want to make it apply to all security.* > xattrs?
The underlying issue here is the notion of security mechanisms which are built as loadable modules. It's not useful for any in-tree users, and introduces several unnecessary problems which then need to be addressed.
A better approach would be to make LSM a statically linked interface.
This would also allow us to unexport the LSM symbols and reduce the API abuse by third-party modules.
- James -- James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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