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    SubjectRe: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching
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    On Thu, 2007-06-21 at 22:17 -0600, Crispin Cowan wrote:
    > James Morris wrote:
    > > On Thu, 21 Jun 2007, Chris Mason wrote:
    > >>> The incomplete mediation flows from the design, since the pathname-based
    > >>> mediation doesn't generalize to cover all objects unlike label- or
    > >>> attribute-based mediation. And the "use the natural abstraction for
    > >>> each object type" approach likewise doesn't yield any general model or
    > >>> anything that you can analyze systematically for data flow.
    > >>>
    > >> This feels quite a lot like a repeat of the discussion at the kernel
    > >> summit. There are valid uses for path based security, and if they don't
    > >> fit your needs, please don't use them. But, path based semantics alone
    > >> are not a valid reason to shut out AA.
    > >>
    > > The validity or otherwise of pathname access control is not being
    > > discussed here.
    > >
    > > The point is that the pathname model does not generalize, and that
    > > AppArmor's inability to provide adequate coverage of the system is a
    > > design issue arising from this.
    > >
    > The above two paragraphs appear to contradict each other.
    >
    > > Recall that the question asked by Lars was whether there were any
    > > outstanding technical issues relating to AppArmor.
    > >
    > > AppArmor does not and can not provide the level of confinement claimed by
    > > the documentation, and its policy does not reflect its actual confinement
    > > properties. That's kind of a technical issue, right?
    > >
    > So if the document said "confinement with respect to direct file access
    > and POSIX.1e capabilities" and that list got extended as AA got new
    > confinement features, would that address your issue?

    That would certainly help, although one might quibble with the use of
    the word "confinement" at all wrt AppArmor (it has a long-established
    technical meaning that implies information flow control, and that goes
    beyond even complete mediation - it requires global and persistent
    protection of the data based on its properties, which requires stable
    and unambiguous identifiers).

    --
    Stephen Smalley
    National Security Agency

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