Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching | From | Stephen Smalley <> | Date | Fri, 22 Jun 2007 07:19:39 -0400 |
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On Thu, 2007-06-21 at 23:17 +0200, Lars Marowsky-Bree wrote: > On 2007-06-21T16:59:54, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: > > > Or can access the data under a different path to which their profile > > does give them access, whether in its final destination or in some > > temporary file processed along the way. > > Well, yes. That is intentional. > > Your point is?
It may very well be unintentional access, especially when taking into account wildcards in profiles and user-writable directories.
> > The emphasis on never modifying applications for security in AA likewise > > has an adverse impact here, as you will ultimately have to deal with > > application mediation of access to their own objects and operations not > > directly visible to the kernel (as we have already done in SELinux for > > D-BUS and others and are doing for X). Otherwise, your "protection" of > > desktop applications is easily subverted. > > That is an interesting argument, but not what we're discussing here. > We're arguing filesystem access mediation.
IOW, anything that AA cannot protect against is "out of scope". An easy escape from any criticism.
> > Um, no. It might not be able to directly open files via that path, but > > showing that it can never read or write your mail is a rather different > > matter. > > Yes. Your use case is different than mine.
My use case is being able to protect data reliably. Yours?
-- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency
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