Messages in this thread | | | Date | Thu, 21 Jun 2007 23:45:36 -0400 | From | Joshua Brindle <> | Subject | Re: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching |
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david@lang.hm wrote: > On Thu, 21 Jun 2007, Joshua Brindle wrote: > >> Lars Marowsky-Bree wrote: >>> On 2007-06-21T16:59:54, Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> wrote: >>> <snip> >>> >>> >>> > Um, no. It might not be able to directly open files via that >>> path, but >>> > showing that it can never read or write your mail is a rather >>> different >>> > matter. >>> > >>> Yes. Your use case is different than mine. >>> >> >> So.. your use case is what? If an AA user asked you to protect his >> mail from his browser I'm sure you'd truthfully answer "no, we can't >> do that but we can protect the path to your mail from your browser".. >> I think not. One need only look at the wonderful marketing literature >> for AA to see what you are telling people it can do, and your above >> statement isn't consistent with that, sorry. > > remember, the policies define a white-list >
Except for unconfined processes.
> so if a hacker wants to have mozilla access the mail files he needs to > get some other process on the sysstem to create a link or move a file > to a path that mozilla does have access to. until that is done there > is no way for mozilla to access the mail through the filesystem. > > other programs could be run that would give mozilla access to the mail > contents, but it would be through some other path that the policy > permitted mozilla accessing in the first place. > Or through IPC or the network, that is the point, filesystem only coverage doesn't cut it; there is no way to say the browser can't access the users mail in AA, and there never will be.
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