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SubjectRe: [AppArmor 39/45] AppArmor: Profile loading and manipulation, pathname matching
Crispin Cowan wrote:
> david@lang.hm wrote:
>
>> On Fri, 8 Jun 2007, Greg KH wrote:
>>
>>> I still want to see a definition of the AA "model" that we can then use
>>> to try to implement using whatever solution works best. As that seems
>>> to be missing the current argument of if AA can or can not be
>>> implemented using SELinux or something totally different should be
>>> stopped.
>>>
>> the way I would describe the difference betwen AA and SELinux is:
>>
>> SELinux is like a default allow IPS system, you have to describe
>> EVERYTHING to the system so that it knows what to allow and what to stop.
>>
>> AA is like a default deny firewall, you describe what you want to
>> happen, and it blocks everything else without you even having to
>> realize that it's there.
>>
> That's not quite right:
>
> * SELinux Strict Policy is a default-deny system: it specifies
> everything that is permitted system wide, and all else is denied.
> * AA and the SELinux Targeted Policy are hybrid systems:
> o default-deny within a policy or profile: confined processes
> are only permitted to do what the policy says, and all else
> is denied.
> o default-allow system wide: unconfined processes are allowed
> to do anything that classic DAC permissions allow.
>
Still not completely correct, though the targeted policy has an
unconfined domain (unconfined_t) the policy still has allow rules for
everything unconfined can do, 2 examples of things unconfined still
can't do (because they aren't allowed by the targeted policy) is execmem
and a while back when there was a /proc exploit that required setattr on
/proc/self/environ; unconfined_t wasn't able to do that either (and
therefore the exploit didn't work on a targeted system).

That said, the differentiation between strict and targeted is going away
soon so that one can have some users be unconfined (but still with a few
restrictions) and others can be fully restricted.

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