Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | From | (Eric W. Biederman) | Subject | Re: [PATCH 2/2] sysctl: Restore the selinux path based label lookup for sysctls. | Date | Wed, 07 Feb 2007 18:57:34 -0700 |
| |
Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov> writes:
> > One related but separate issue is that the /proc/sys inode labeling is > also affected by the sysctl patch series. Those inodes used to be > labeled by selinux_proc_get_sid (from selinux_d_instantiate), but that > no longer works, so they now fall back to the superblock SID (generic > proc label). That changes the inode permission checks on an attempt to > access a /proc/sys node and will likely cause denials under current > policy for confined domains since one wouldn't generally be writing to > the generic proc label. If you always called sysctl_perm from the proc > sysctl code, we could possibly dispense with inode permission checking > on those inodes, e.g. marking them private.
Like this?
It seems a little weird but I'm happy with it if you are.
Eric
diff --git a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c index b9d59c0..7d6f7c7 100644 --- a/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c +++ b/fs/proc/proc_sysctl.c @@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ static struct inode *proc_sys_make_inode(struct inode *dir, struct ctl_table *ta inode->i_mtime = inode->i_atime = inode->i_ctime = CURRENT_TIME; inode->i_op = &proc_sys_inode_operations; inode->i_fop = &proc_sys_file_operations; + inode->i_flags |= S_PRIVATE; /* tell selinux to ignore this inode */ proc_sys_refresh_inode(inode, table); out: return inode; - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
| |