Messages in this thread Patch in this message | | | Date | Thu, 29 Nov 2007 00:06:59 +0100 | From | Jiri Slaby <> | Subject | named + capset = EPERM [Was: 2.6.24-rc3-mm2] |
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On 11/28/2007 12:41 PM, Andrew Morton wrote: > ftp://ftp.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/akpm/patches/2.6/2.6.24-rc3/2.6.24-rc3-mm2/ [...] > +capabilities-introduce-per-process-capability-bounding-set.patch
A regression against -mm1. This patch breaks bind (9.5.0-18.a7.fc8): capset(0x19980330, 0, {CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH|CAP_SETGID|CAP_SETUID|CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE|CAP_SYS_CHROOT|CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH|CAP_SETGID|CAP_SETUID|CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE|CAP_SYS_CHROOT|CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, 0}) = -1 EPERM (Operation not permitted)
$ grep SEC .config CONFIG_SECCOMP=y # CONFIG_NETWORK_SECMARK is not set CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_KRB5=m # CONFIG_RPCSEC_GSS_SPKM3 is not set # CONFIG_SECURITY is not set # CONFIG_SECURITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES is not set
probably this hunk?: @@ -133,6 +119,12 @@ int cap_capset_check (struct task_struct /* incapable of using this inheritable set */ return -EPERM; } + if (!!cap_issubset(*inheritable, + cap_combine(target->cap_inheritable, + current->cap_bset))) { + /* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */ + return -EPERM; + }
/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */ if (!cap_issubset (*permitted,
regards, -- Jiri Slaby (jirislaby@gmail.com) Faculty of Informatics, Masaryk University - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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