Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sun, 10 Sep 2006 18:09:54 +0200 | From | David Madore <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH 3/4] security: capabilities patch (version 0.4.4), part 3/4: introduce new capabilities |
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On Sun, Sep 10, 2006 at 05:23:13PM +0100, Alan Cox wrote: > CAP_REG_EXEC seems meaningless, I can do the same with mmap by hand for > most types of binary execution except setuid (which is separate it > seems)
Actually I meant those caps to be more of a proof of concept than as a really useful set, so I have nothing against CAP_REG_EXEC being deleted. However, it still performs one (small) function even in the absence of suid/sgid executables: you can execute files with omde --x which you can't do with mmap(). (Also, I'm not 100% sure the kernel doesn't do some magic things on exec(), perhaps some magic forms of accounting or whatever, which you couldn't do with mmap().)
> Given the capability model is accepted as inferior to things like > SELinux policies why do we actually want to fix this anyway. It's > unfortunate we can't discard the existing capabilities model (which has > flaws) as well really.
Can a non-root user create limited-rights processes without assistance from the sysadmin, under SElinux? I was under the impression that it wasn't the case. Also, SElinux is immensely more difficult to understand and operate with than a mere set of capabilities: and I think that simplicity is (sometimes) of value.
-- David A. Madore (david.madore@ens.fr, http://www.madore.org/~david/ ) - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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