Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: Time to remove LSM (was Re: [RESEND][RFC][PATCH 2/7] implementation of LSM hooks) | From | Stephen Smalley <> | Date | Tue, 25 Apr 2006 12:23:03 -0400 |
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On Mon, 2006-04-24 at 09:04 -0500, Serge E. Hallyn wrote: > Quoting Alan Cox (alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk): > > Thus this sort of stuff needs to be taken seriously. Can SuSE provide a > > good reliable policy for AppArmour to people, can Red Hat do the same > > with SELinux ? > > That's a little more than half the question. The other 40% is can users > write good policies. > > I think it will, and already has, become easier for selinux. But in > this case I wonder whether some sort of contest could be beneficial. We > all know of Russel Coker's open root selinux play machines. That's a > powerful statement. Things I'd like to see in addition are > > a. a similar setup with apparmour > b. a similar setup where "mere mortals" set up the selinux policy > > For the first few rounds, rather than judge one way or the other, we > could hopefully publish the results in a way to encourage a flurry of > selinux policy tools - one of which may actually be useful.
Personally, I view such contests or challenge machines as meaningless. At best, they can only show the presence of a flaw, never that the system is "secure". And the people most capable of breaking such systems are not likely to go near such a play machine knowingly. The SELinux play machines were nice from an educational point of view, allowing people to experiment with a SELinux system without needing to install and set it up themselves, particularly in the days when SELinux was not integrated into any distro. But as a meaningful measure of security, such contests or challenge/play machines aren't really useful.
-- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency
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