Messages in this thread | | | Subject | Re: [RFC][PATCH 0/11] security: AppArmor - Overview | From | Stephen Smalley <> | Date | Tue, 25 Apr 2006 11:01:05 -0400 |
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On Tue, 2006-04-25 at 14:43 +0200, Andi Kleen wrote: > On Tuesday 25 April 2006 14:42, James Carter wrote: > > > I talk to one of the unconfined people at the table and ask them to > > rename the "knife" to "spoon". Now I am free to do what I wish. > > That assumes that your jail allows talking to other people.
AppArmor doesn't control IPC (which has been noted previously), and it isn't clear how one generalizes its path-based scheme to handle all kinds of kernel operations. So it isn't even a very good jail-like mechanism. Which brings up an interesting topic of its own: If you want the AppArmor model, then why not just use existing jail-like or virtualization mechanisms? IIUC, Vservers and OpenVZ are already far more complete in their coverage than AppArmor and leverage existing kernel mechanisms like namespaces that at least have well-defined semantics. I expect that I could achieve a much higher degree of confidence in such a mechanism than in AppArmor. Why can't AppArmor just become a userspace tool for configuring namespaces and setting up the environment in which the application runs?
> > You don't care about the name "knife", you care about the object it > > represents. > > In the apparmor model you only care about what the application is allowed > to do. If it does anything extraordinary like trying to talk to people it > shouldn't talk to it gets a veto.
Again, it doesn't control IPC.
-- Stephen Smalley National Security Agency
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