Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 14 Feb 2006 00:09:47 +0200 | From | "Michael S. Tsirkin" <> | Subject | Re: [openib-general] Re: madvise MADV_DONTFORK/MADV_DOFORK |
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Quoting r. Hugh Dickins <hugh@veritas.com>: > Subject: Re: [openib-general] Re: madvise MADV_DONTFORK/MADV_DOFORK > > On Mon, 13 Feb 2006, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote: > > > > Like this then? > > Almost. I would still prefer madvise_vma to allow MADV_DONTFORK > on a VM_IO vma, even though it must prohibit MADV_DOFORK there. > But if Linus disagrees, of course ignore me.
I'm not sure about this point. Linus?
> Comments much better, thanks. I didn't get your point about mlock'd > memory, but I'm content to believe you're thinking of an issue that > hasn't occurred to me.
I'm referring to the follwing, from man mlock(2):
"Cryptographic security software often handles critical bytes like passwords or secret keys as data structures. As a result of paging, these secrets could be transfered onto a persistent swap store medium, where they might be accessible to the enemy long after the security software has erased the secrets in RAM and terminated."
-- Michael S. Tsirkin Staff Engineer, Mellanox Technologies - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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