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    SubjectRe: [PATCH encrypted swsusp 1/3] core functionality
    Matt Mackall wrote:

    > Any sensible solution here is going to require remembering passwords.
    > And arguably anywhere the user needs encrypted suspend, they'll want
    > encrypted swap as well.

    But after entering the password and resuming, the encrypted swap is
    accessible again and my ssh-key may be lying around in it, right?

    So we would need to zero out the suspend image in swap to prevent the
    retrieval of this data from the running machine (imagine a
    remote-root-hole).

    Zeroing out the suspend image means "write lots of megabytes to the
    disk" which takes a lot of time.

    The "encrypted suspend" case avoids this. It is absolutely useless for
    the "machine is stolen while suspended" case, since the key for
    decrypting the suspend image is stored in the suspend header (but
    destroyed during resume).

    We need both:
    - encrypted swap for the "stolen while suspended" case
    - encrypted suspend for "broken into after resume while still running"
    case.

    i hope this helps...

    Stefan
    --
    seife
    Never trust a computer you can't lift.
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