Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sun, 10 Apr 2005 20:18:46 +0200 | From | Pavel Machek <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] zero disk pages used by swsusp on resume |
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Hi!
> > Hi! What about doing it right? Encrypt it with symmetric cypher > > and store key in suspend header. That way key is removed automagically > > while fixing signatures. No need to clear anythink. > > Good idea. I'll have a look though it will take a while (busy with my job). > > > OTOH we may want to dm-crypt whole swap partition. > > This would leave the problem that the in-kernel data would be accessible > on the swap device after resume.
I meant "when dm-crypt is used, encrypting swsusp data with second key is no longer _that_ nice"...
So perhaps we should encrypt swap by default with random key, and reuse same code for swsusp...
> > -- pavel. Sent from mobile phone. Sorry for poor formatting. > > The only remark I do have here is that swsusp would then depend on > crypto so the swsusp encryption should be a config option.
Yes. Not evereyone has so fast CPU that encryption is NOP.
Pavel -- Boycott Kodak -- for their patent abuse against Java. - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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