Messages in this thread | | | Date | Sat, 7 Aug 2004 12:27:46 -0400 | From | Jean-Luc Cooke <> | Subject | Re: [PATCH] Delete cryptoloop |
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On Mon, Aug 02, 2004 at 07:16:56PM -0400, James Morris wrote: > On Mon, 2 Aug 2004, David Wagner wrote: > > > The point I was making is that there are other scenarios where Cryptoloop > > falls apart in much more devastating ways. For instance, if the attacker > > can modify the ciphertexts stored on your hard disk and you continue > > using the hard disk afterwards, then really nasty attacks become possible. > > Other attacks become possible if the attacker can observe the ciphertexts > > stored on your hard disk at multiple points in time. The question I was > > asking is this: Does anyone care about these latter types of scenarios? > > I think the common threat scenarios out of the above are: > > 1) Attacker can observe ciphertexts at multiple points in time. > 2) Attacker steals disk/computer and disappears with it.
Examples for #1 being: mounting a file system image across NFS (their home directory for example). In this case, and attacker can see almost *all* disk reads and writes.
Thanks for your input on this David W., I was @ OLS... silly intermittent WiFi...
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