Messages in this thread | | | Date | Tue, 30 Nov 2004 11:29:03 -0800 | From | Chris Wright <> | Subject | Re: 2.6.10-rc2-mm4 |
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* Stephen Smalley (sds@epoch.ncsc.mil) wrote: > On Tue, 2004-11-30 at 12:50, Andrew Morton wrote: > > http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/kernel/people/akpm/patches/2.6/2.6.10-rc2/2.6.10-rc2-mm4/ > <snip> > > selinux-adds-a-private-inode-operation.patch > > selinux: adds a private inode operation > > Below is a re-base to 2.6.10-rc2-mm4 of a patch I posted earlier during > the original discussion of the above referenced patch. This patch > removes the unnecessary code in inode_doinit_with_dentry, replaces the > unused inherits flag field (legacy from earlier code) with a private > flag field, does not set the SID in selinux_inode_mark_private (leaving > it with the unlabeled SID, which will ensure that we notice it if it > ever reaches a SELinux permission check), and modifies SELinux > permission checking functions and post_create() to test for the private > flag and skip SELinux processing in that case. Please include if/when > the reiserfs/selinux patchset goes upstream. I know that Chris Wright > had raised the question of whether we should be using i_flags to convey > the "private" nature of the inode rather than using a security hook, but > didn't see any resolution of that issue.
My concerns are that the check has to be duplicated in any module, and that thus far we've tried to keep out fs -> module communication, letting vfs do it. This could at least be fs -> vfs communication, and then either vfs or security framework could check flags and never call into module on fs private objects.
thanks, -chris -- Linux Security Modules http://lsm.immunix.org http://lsm.bkbits.net - To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-kernel" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html Please read the FAQ at http://www.tux.org/lkml/
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