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SubjectRe: [PATCH] new syscall: flink
Date
Clayton Weaver wrote:
>Once a process unlinks the last directory entry referencing a particular
>inode that it has an
>open fd for and then passes the open fd to some other process
>(regardless of exactly how it does that), it seems to me that it has
>conceded any interest in the previous security constraints associated
>with that inode or with the recently
>unlinked last directory entry for it.

Huh? That's not the Unix model. If I pass you a read-only file
descriptor, you're not supposed to be able to get write access to
the fd. If you can, that's a security hole. This is true whether
the fd refers to an inode still linked into the filesystem or not.

>The cases with potential security implications are all in the context of
>flink()ing to an open fd for an inode that still corresponds to at least
>one directory entry.

No, that's not correct.
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